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CHINA’S COVID-19 DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
MOTIVATIONS AND METHODS
Margaret Myers

B

eginning in February 2020, China’s diplomatic
community—together with Chinese provincial
and municipal governments, businesses, and media
outlets—set forth to shape opinions of China in the Latin
American and Caribbean (LAC) region, when many
in LAC had mixed views of China and its relationship
with COVID-19. In the following months, China engaged
not only in the delivery of personal protective equipment
(PPE) and, more recently, vaccines to LAC countries but
also launched an extensive messaging campaign, carried
out through traditional and social media by Chinese
embassies and media outlets across the region.  
Analysis of trends in China’s coronavirus-era engagement with LAC reveals striking developments in
China’s aid delivery and public messaging toward the region and also in China’s broader approach to LAC relations. China’s engagement with LAC amid the pandemic
can be divided into two distinct phases.
•

•

The first of these was most evident from February
to around September 2020. It consisted of sales and
donations of medical equipment and other forms
of cooperation and assistance, such as advisory
services and consultations between medical professionals from China and LAC nations, and some
instances of cooperation on vaccine testing and development.1  
Based on a review of 470 announcements of Chinese
PPE deliveries announced in Chinese, Latin American, and other media sources—as well as Chinese
embassy Twitter accounts2 —the pace of PPE deliveries slowed considerably after summer 2020 (see
Figure 1), as China focused more extensively on
vaccine development and distribution—the second
phase in China’s COVID-19 outreach.  

China’s COVID-19 assistance is meant to achieve
wide-ranging objectives. In addition to humanitarian
motivations, which are frequently underscored by Chinese officials and generally supported at home by the
Chinese public,3 China’s COVID-19 aid and broader
economic outreach have also sought to reinforce and
strengthen bilateral ties throughout the region—to ensure, above all, that China emerges from the pandemic
with its image generally intact, and to simultaneously
advance some of China’s commercial objectives and policy interests, including the political isolation of Taiwan.  
For the companies involved in China’s international outreach, the pandemic was an opportunity to highlight their commitment to those countries and communities where they operate. For China’s tech firms, the
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pandemic also provided an opportunity to showcase new
biomedical technologies and artificial intelligence-enabled diagnostic capabilities.
In the early months of the pandemic, China employed a notably decentralized aid campaign, leveraging
wide-ranging Chinese actors and on-the-ground networks to deliver medical supplies to LAC nations.  
It entailed loosely coordinated engagement
by wide-ranging Chinese actors, including Chinese embassies, companies, provincial government authorities,
networks of overseas Chinese communities, and quasi-governmental organizations, such as the Chinese Red
Cross. This approach was targeted and flexible, allowing
for often-impromptu donations to hard-hit communities, local organizations, and individuals capable of influencing China’s broader commercial and political interests.
China’s initial “aid blitz,” whether delivered by
Chinese companies, embassies, overseas communities,
the Chinese Red Cross, or other actors, was carried out
at a pivotal moment for global opinion on China and
COVID-19.  
Amid mounting critiques and accusations, China
sought to position itself in LAC and other regions as a
responsible actor and proponent of cooperation at
a moment of global crisis.4 Much of this work fell to
China’s embassies, which, in addition to coordinating donations and sales of PPE and vaccines, labored
throughout the pandemic to convey specific messages
about China’s experience with the coronavirus and its
pandemic outreach.
Of interest in China’s communications campaign
was an increase in assertive messaging in the early
months of the pandemic, characteristic of the so-called
“wolf warrior” diplomacy that featured prominently in
academic and policy accounts of China’s external communications in spring 2020. In most cases, China’s
sharp-edged defensive rhetoric was accompanied by
promotional messaging, which, along with an emphasis
on cooperation and multilateralism, has since dominated China’s communications with the region.  
Recent efforts to isolate Taiwan mark a clearer-than-ever departure in LAC from China’s long-standing policy of noninterference. China has been effective,
in the short term at least, in using its role as a provider
of vaccines to the region to quell criticism of China and
influence Taiwan-related policymaking.  
China, directly and indirectly, encouraged Taiwan’s
allies to rethink their diplomatic allegiances. Beijing
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suggested that Honduras seek a “diplomatic bridge”
to purchase Chinese vaccines, for instance.5 China also
sought to influence Taiwan’s relations with Paraguay
by conditioning the transfer of vaccines on changes
in those countries’ Taiwan policies. Guyana received
200,000 doses of Chinese vaccine after deciding to close
a new commercial office with Taiwan.  
Vaccines have also been used to reward or discourage other LAC government actions. In Brazil,
China reportedly halted the shipment of raw materials
necessary for the São Paulo-based Butantan Institute
to produce China’s CoronaVac vaccine6 after President Jair Bolsonaro suggested that China disseminated
COVID-19 as a tactic of biological warfare.7

influence in the region. We noted a substantial overall increase in LAC tweets about China during the
pandemic. Before the pandemic, 41,098 geo-referenced tweets mentioned China. More than three
times as many (144,181 tweets) referenced China
during the pandemic. The terms used in these tweets
were not strongly positively or negatively weighted,
however.11

•

The effects of China’s outreach may be more striking in the commercial realm in LAC, to the extent
that Chinese companies have indeed solidified or
generated new ties amid the pandemic. Any benefits to Chinese companies from their extended outreach could take considerable time to materialize,
however, and will undoubtedly vary on a company-by-company basis. LAC Twitter users referenced
Huawei fewer times during the pandemic (5,376
tweets) than before (7,870 tweets), despite the company’s relatively robust pandemic outreach.

•

As Financial Times Latin America Editor Michael
Stott noted in a May 2021 Inter-American Dialogue
event, it is probable that neither China nor U.S.-China competition are foremost for most in LAC at this
juncture. LAC leaders, in most cases, are seeking
critical COVID-19 solutions, regardless of their
source.  

Despite the efforts of wide-ranging Chinese actors,
China’s COVID-19 diplomacy has been more successful
in advancing some of China’s objectives than others.

•

China’s extensive messaging campaigns and medical assistance arguably helped avoid an image crisis
at the pandemic’s onset.  

•

China’s decentralized approach provided it with
considerable flexibility and visibility when operating
in LAC. By deploying on-the-ground assets to support China’s diplomatic objectives, China was able
to respond in near real-time to developments in the
region, changing course as needed.

•

China’s LAC-based entities were also able to target
the delivery of numerous, small donations to specific communities and individuals, in occasional support of broader commercial and political interests.

•

China’s approach was also occasionally problematic,
however. Francisco Urdinez has noted the challenges of coordinating China’s decentralized approach,
including occasional miscommunications and diplomatic blunders.8 In Chile, poor coordination among
Chinese actors resulted in a serious misunderstanding with Chilean officials.9 Courting LAC officials
with PPE kits and vaccines is also a problematic and
potentially corruption-inducing practice.  

•

•

China’s experiment with “wolf warrior”-type messaging may have had unintended effects, as Yale
University’s Daniel C. Mattingly and James Sundquist noted. Wolf warrior diplomacy, they say, has
backfired on numerous occasions.10
Our analysis of tweets from the LAC region suggests
that while LAC audiences possibly view China as
more impactful on LAC affairs than before the pandemic, they are still ambivalent about China and its
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Ultimately, this exercise has been an experimental
one for China, whether through the use of an impromptu
and often-decentralized aid campaign, the development
of new medical technologies, or by employing novel approaches to communications with the region. China’s
approach has supported numerous objectives, whether
economic or diplomatic, but wide-ranging factors will
determine the overall impact of Chinese outreach. These
include the effectiveness of Chinese vaccines and the
extent of commitments by partner nations during the
pandemic and after, as LAC prepares for a period of prolonged economic and social recovery.  
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